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CASE NOTES
ANTITRUST-ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-SECTION 2(b) DEFENSE UN-
AVAILABLE WHERE GASOLINE SUPPLIER CUT PRICE TO A RETAILER
To ALLOW LATTER To MEET ITS COMPETITION.
FTC v. Sun Oil Co. (U.S. 1962)
Sun Oil Company refines, sells and distributes gasoline throughout
the United States. Sun sells to thirty-eight service stations in Jacksonville,
Florida, which are owned by independent contractors who buy gasoline
from Sun and resell it to their customers. Super Test Oil Company,
a non-major competitor of Sun, operated a service station near one of
Sun's retail dealers. Sun's dealer was selling gas at 28.9¢ per gallon,
the prevailing price in the area for a major brand product. At this time,
Sun was supplying gasoline to its retail dealers in the area at 24.1¢
per gallon. Super Test cut its retail prices from 26.9¢ per gallon to as
low as 20.9V per gallon. Sun's retailer, on the verge of going out of
business due to the subsequent loss of customers to Super Test, asked
and received from Sun a reduction in its wholesale price to him so that
he might meet the competition. Sun did not reduce the wholesale price
to its other retailers in the area. The Federal Trade Commission com-
plained that Sun had violated § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act,' by lowering its price to only one of its
1. Clayton Act § 2(a), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (Robinson-Patman
Act), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between dif-
ferent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any
of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . .
and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That
nothing [herein] contained . . . shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such pur-
chasers sold or delivered: . . . And provided further, That nothing [herein] con-
tained . . . shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise
in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in
restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing [herein] contained . . .
shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing
conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned,
such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods,
obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good
faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.
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dealers in the Jacksonville area. The Commission rejected Sun's contention
that the reductions were good faith price reductions made to meet
competition, within the meaning of the proviso of § 2(b) of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.2 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Commission's decision,
holding that the defense of meeting competition in good faith pursuant to
the proviso of § 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act is available to a
supplier who reduces prices to one but not to all of its dealers to compete
effectively at the retail level.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding, with two justices concurring in the Court's conclusion, that the
"good faith meeting of competition" defense of § 2(b) of the Robinson-
Patman Act was not available to a supplier of gasoline under these cir-
cumstances. 4 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., U.S. -, 83 S. Ct. 358 (1963).
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,5 as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act, prohibits price discrimination between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality where the effect may be to substantially
lessen competition, except when due to the cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery. Section 2(b) of the same Act 6 contains a proviso permitting
a seller to rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination by showing
"that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low
price of a competitor." This proviso has been frequently labeled the "good
faith meeting of competition" defense of § 2(b). However, it is so vague
and indefinite that it has brought caustic criticism from the United States
Supreme Court.7 The Court has been called upon to help clarify the
section's inherent vagueness on several occasions.8 In Standard Oil
Company v. FTC,9 it was held that § 2(b) provides a complete defense
2. Clayton Act § 2(b), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (Robinson-Patman
Act), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958):
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there
has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of
rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the
person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the
discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing [herein] contained . . . shall
prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his
lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the ser-
vices or facilities furnished by a competitor.
3. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961).
4. That is, where a supplier of gasoline granted a discriminatory price reduction
to only one of a number of its independent retailers to enable that retailer to meet
price reductions by a station owned and operated by a competing retail chain and
where there was no showing of any price having been set or offered by a direct
competitor of a supplier the defense is not available.
5. Supra note 1.
6. Supra note 2.
7. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65, 73 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (1953).
8. FTC v. A. E. Staley Co., 324 U.S. 746, 65 S. Ct. 971 (1945); Automatic
Canteen Co. v. FTC, supra note 7; Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 71 S. Ct.
240 (1951).
9. 340 U.S. 231, 246-250, 71 S. Ct. 240, 248-250 (1951). In this case, Standard
Oil was selling gasoline to its "jobbers" at a lower price than to its small service
station customers. The "jobbers" were selling to other Standard retailers at lower
[VOL. 8
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to an alleged violation of § 2(a) where the lower price allowed any
purchaser is granted in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor. Section 2(b) allows a seller to meet a competitor's price but
does not allow undercutting a competitor.' 0 The discrimination must
meet a particular competitor's price rather than competition in general and
the discrimination must be temporary and not part of a permanent
pricing system."
Congressman Patman stated that his bill (which ultimately became
the Robinson-Patman Act) was "designed to accomplish what so far
the Clayton Act has only weakly attempted, namely, to protect the
independent merchant, the public whom he serves and the manufacturer
from whom he buys, from exploitation by his chain competitor.' '1 2 In the
present case an independent retail dealer was competing with a chain
competitor and was, therefore, a person to be protected under the Robinson-
Patman Act. In Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. The Texas Co.,' 3 a case
similar on its facts to the instant case, it was held that § 2(b) did not
apply since meeting an equally low price permits a seller to offer a
discriminatory price only if his favored buyer has access to an equally
low price of a competing seller. It was not meant to apply when the
competing offers converged on the dealer's level. This decision has been
criticized 1 4 and other courts have favored the interpretation of the proviso
given by the lower court in the present case rather than the narrower
interpretation given in Enterprise.15 Nevertheless, the latter interpretation
seems to be the better one. In the present case there is a certain emotional
appeal in that Sun was coming to the aid of one of its independently owned
retail customers who was immediately involved in a price war with a
chain-operated competitor; however, this does not alter the fact that Sun
was meeting, not its own competition, but the competition of its be-
sieged retailer at the expense of other Sun dealers in the area. Such
action is condemned by § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.16
prices than the company was charging the stations it supplied directly. It was
shown that the reduced prices were given in order to keep the "jobbers" as customers.
The Court held the § 2(b) defense was an absolute defense when the seller shows
that the price differential has been made to meet a lawful and equally low price of a
competitor. A seller can meet a competitor's offer to one of his customers without
granting reductions to other customers even though injury might result to the
unfavored customers since Congress intended to permit the natural consequences
of the seller's lawful reduction.
10. Samuel H. Morse, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734, 66 S. Ct. 44 (1945).
11. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, 401, 78 S. Ct. 369, 372 (1958)
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 725, 68 S. Ct. 793, 815 (1948).
12. 79 Cong. Rec. 9078 (1935).
13. 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965, 77 S. Ct. 1049 (1957).
14. Note, The Good Faith Defense of The Robinson-Patman Act: A New
Restriction Appraised, 66 YALt L.J. 935, 941-42 (1957).
15. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955).
cert. denied. 350 U.S. 991, 76 S. Ct. 545 (1956). See also American Cooperative
Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied. 329
U.S. 721, 67 S. Ct. 57 (1946); Gerber Products Co. v. Beechnut Life Savers, 160
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
16. Supra note 1.
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In the present decision, the Court expressly refused to consider what
the result would have been if it had appeared either that Super Test, the
competitor of Sun's independent retailer, were an integrated supplier-
retailer or that it had received a price cut from its own supplier -
presumably, a competitor of Sun.17 If Super Test had been an integrated
supplier which owned and operated its own service stations, such stations
would merely be appendages of the company. The latter could then
compete directly with service stations which were independently owned
but affiliated with another oil company, since it would be meeting directly
its own competition. But even if Super Test were integrated, the rationale
of the present case would still be applicable since Sun would be meeting
its buyer's competition, not its own, and would still be discriminating against
its other customers in the area. The same would be true if it appeared
Super Test had received a price cut from its supplier since this would
not affect Sun's behavior in discriminating against some of its own
dealers in the area. Sun, in contending that its customers were in
reality merely conduits and that the company was actually competing
with Super Test on the retail level, was attempting to gain the competi-
tive advantages attendant upon integration without incurring the ex-
penses of such an operation. Under this approach, Sun could cut prices
to one dealer, since it would be meeting its own competition, and still
be under no obligation to grant similar price cuts to its other dealers
under the claim that a seller can meet a competitor's offer to his
customer without granting a reduction to its other customers.' s The
Court, in the instant case, however, rejected this contention, stating:
In a very real sense, however, every retailer is but a "conduit" for
the goods which he sells and every supplier could, in the same sense,
be considered a competitor of retailers selling competing goods. We
are sure Congress had no such broad conception of competition in
mind when it established the section 2(b) defense and, certainly, it
intended no special exception for the petroleum industry. 19
It still can be argued, consistent with both statutory interpretation
and economic policy, that if Super Test does receive a price cut from its
supplier a different result should be reached. Section 2(b) does not
specifically provide that the price to be met must be a competitor's price
to one's own customer; the reference is to meeting a competitor's price.
If Super Test's supplier is considered a competitor of Sun, as realistically
he is, Sun, by cutting its price to its retailer, is merely meeting its
competitor's price. The economics of the situation would also seem to
dictate a different result since Super Test's supplier, through the re-
tailer, would be competing with Sun's retailer, that is, the competition
would no longer be retailer versus retailer. Although this argument
17. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., - U.S. -, 83 S. Ct. 358, 363 and n.7 (1963).
18. Supra note 9.
19. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 17 at -, 83 S. Ct. at 369. 4
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has great appeal, it should be noted that the Court in the present decision
reversed the lower court instead of remanding the case,20 leading one
to believe that the Court would have reached the same result even had
the facts been as suggested above.
In any event, it appears that what Sun was seeking, in effect, was a
special application of the law as applied to the petroleum industry.
Indeed, a change may very well be necessary since the major focus of
competition in the petroleum industry is at the retail level; but the change,
if it is to be made, must be as the result of congressional action. The
Court recognized the danger to independent retailers if the major oil
companies should integrate, but also acknowledged that it was not the
function of the Court to determine broad economic policy.2 1 In the Enter-
prise case, it was noted that speaking of price competition at the level of
sales by the oil company to the station may be a fiction. But, under the
present law, the "good faith meeting of competition" defense of § 2(b)
only enables a seller to meet his own competition. Restricting this de-
fense to the situation where there is direct competition at the seller's
level certainly seems to be rather harsh doctrine and has been
criticized as such.22 Under this strict interpretation, it is questionable
whether the oil company could grant an area-wide price reduction since
the proviso of § 2(b) places emphasis "on individual competitive situa-
tions rather than upon a general system of competition.1 23 Further, a wide-
spread price reduction could be interpreted either as not having been
made in good faith or as a non-defensive price cut.2 4 Although these
alternatives involve price cuts and the dangers inherent in them, this
rigid doctrine has its beneficial aspects as well. It adds incentive to
research in the oil industry to find cheaper methods for manufacturing
gasoline since now the industry knows it cannot compete with minor oil
companies simply by discriminatorily cutting prices. The major oil
companies are well established and known to the motoring public as
producers of high quality products, whereas the minor oil companies are
relatively unknown and, in fact, because of their lower prices, may be
suspected by some consumers of marketing a product which is not equal
to the major company's products. The major oil companies have the
resources for nationwide advertising campaigns which benefit their in-
dependently owned retail customers. It must be remembered that the
owner of a service station is like any other small merchant who must
survive or fail according to his own talents, ingenuity and personal
20. Id. at - , 83 S. Ct. at 372. The separate memorandum of Justices Harlan
and Stewart urge this result.
21. Id. at - , 83 S. Ct. at 371.
22. See Steele, Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 8 VILL. L.
REv. 43 (1962).
23. E. Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978, 1006-07 (1955).
24. Standard Motors Products Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826, 80 S. Ct. 73 (1959), where it was stated that dis-
crimination can be justified when it is necessary to retain an old customer but not
to gain a new one. But see Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
CASE NOTES
5
Walsh: Antitrust - Robinson-Patman Act - Section 2(b) Defense Unavailabl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
